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I am sympathetic to Jensen’s aim to “bring
language and emotion back together.” To
speak is among other things to communi-
cate one’s affective state to others, and this
communication is typically effectuated by
embodied agents whose affective state also
manifests in their face, posture, gestures,
facial expressions, and tone of voice. When
I talk to someone I usually look at them
in a more or less engaged way; I may
also smile or frown, nod sympathetically
or shake my head in disapproval, giggle,
laugh, gesticulate, alter the volume and
pace of my voice, and so on. These actions
are partly responses to what to the other
says and how he says it, and often have
the function of affecting how the interac-
tion continues (a nod may communicate
approval at what is being said as well as
encouragement to carry on). The interac-
tions analyzed by Jensen nicely illustrate
clear instances in which language is con-
tinuous and integrated with other types
of bodily engagement with other people.
In addition to being responses to others,
my actions, when I speak, are also often
related to the meaning of my words. As I
am telling my friend about the climb I did
on the weekend, I move my head down
and close my eyes when I tell her how
scared I was of the height and that I did not
want to look down; I reproduce climbing
movements with my hands or even the rest
of the body when I tell her about a difficult
passage; I spread my arms when I tell her
about the 360-degree view from the top
of the mountain, etc. Here as well we can
see a continuity between language in the
sense of well-formed word-based speech,
and a variety of communicative bodily
gestures.
So, I agree with much of what Jensen
says in his article. However, I remain
unclear about his use of the notion of
“languaging,” particularly about its rela-
tionship to bodily sense making. I under-
stand the point of talking of “languaging”
to denote “language as an activity” (p. 2),1
namely as a process and as a behavior
rather than as a static system of symbols
and rules. But the notion of languaging in
Jensen’s paper also appears to be stretched
to include all instances of bodily sense
making, which I think is problematic. For
example, at the beginning of the article
Jensen writes that languaging is first-order
“behavior or whole-body sense making”
(p. 1, footnote 1); and at the end he sug-
gests that preparing a meal in the presence
of others, yet without using words, can also
be seen as an instance of languaging—if
done “in a very distinct way” (p. 12) that
communicates some kind of affect (“a hec-
tic, hasty, and perhaps even angry way of
cooking,” p. 12).
Now, “whole-body sense making” may
well be what grounds word-based lin-
guistic phenomena, but it can also occur
before language is acquired—so it’s not
clear that we should call all cases of bodily
intersubjective sensemaking “languaging.”
We know from developmental psychol-
ogy that already shortly after birth infants
interact with their caregivers by respond-
ing to bodily contact, vocalizations, and
1Page numbers refer to the online version of Jensen’s
article.
gaze direction (e.g., Tronick et al., 1979;
Tronick, 2003). In the first year of life,
infants engage in progressively richer
interactions with the caregiver, in what
is known as “affect attunement,” i.e., the
cross-modal matching of vocalizations and
bodily movements in terms of rhythm and
intensity (e.g., Stern, 1985; Legerstee et al.,
2007). The term “primary subjectivity”
(Trevarthen, 1979), which Jensen men-
tions, refers to these and other skills that
are present very early in development—
such as imitation, a capacity to distin-
guish between inanimate objects and peo-
ple, and a responsiveness to others’ facial
expressions. These skills arguably embody
a pragmatic form of understanding oth-
ers (e.g., Gallagher, 2001), also dubbed a
“participatory sense making” (De Jaegher
and Di Paolo, 2007). Although these forms
of bodily attunement do not disappear
once language is acquired, and may be
necessary for language acquisition (includ-
ing systematicity and compositionality),
in infants they seem to be best charac-
terized as prelinguistic, as they do not
require the capacity to utter words and
meaningful sentences. Thus, to character-
ize them as instances of languaging, where
“languaging” is (also) taken to denote
“language as an activity,” seems mislead-
ing. Moreover, to do so may even con-
vey the message that forms of intersub-
jective bodily attunement are immature
forms of sense making, waiting to be
fully realized once language is acquired,
rather than complete and autonomous
stages of development. Incidentally, I do
not think that Jensen believes this is the
case, given that at some point he writes
that “the contours of languaging, in its
most basic form, are definitely grounded
in such early intersubjective behaviors”
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(p. 6)—namely, he seems to think that not
all instances of bodily intersubjectivity are
forms of languaging. But then we are left
with the question of what distinguishes
the two.
I thus agree with Jensen when he
acknowledges, at the end of his arti-
cle, that his approach raises serious
conceptual challenges. As conceptual,
however, they will not be answered by per-
forming “many further studies” (p. 12),
but only by clarifying one’s theoretical
framework and adopting a consistent
terminology.
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